But even if they do, even if you think we are free in a [KL] sense, how do you propose to shoulder the burden of proof, provided by the problem of luck? How do you propose to discharge that burden, in terms of an argument that you take to be sound?
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Choosing is evidently a mental act, even if it is somehow also physical. If Cartesian substance dualism is true, and if we are free at all, then it looks like we would have to be free in a [KL] sense: at some stage in the mental process of choosing, [KL] holds open the possibility that what you do is not determined, if only at the level of the quantum events ingredient in your higher level brain events—even if substance dualism is true, causal interaction between mind and body is also true, and so in the case of free choice it seems that the undetermined events required for any kind of libertarianism, including [KL], would most likely occur at the quantum level. But even if they do, even if you think we are free in a [KL] sense, how do you propose to shoulder the burden of proof, provided by the problem of luck? How do you propose to discharge that burden, in terms of an argument that you take to be sound?
Suppose by contrast that substance dualism is false, and that the best model of the mind is the model of the Turing machine, in this case, such a machine embodied in familiar biological terms. This would seem to speak in favor of our being free in at most the [FC] sense. But if that is so, if you think we are free in an [FC] sense, in part because the Turing machine is a better model of the mind than Cartesian dualism, then how do you propose to discharge the burden of proof, provided by the Consequence argument? How do you propose to discharge that burden, in terms of an argument that you take to be sound?
If your thinking about the mind and freedom is limited to the context of popular philosophy, then answering such questions, or rather their popular counterparts, is a relatively simple affair. You just figure out somehow what you think, and express what you think on the topic, perhaps even by making a video and posting it on Youtube.
You might also think that if anyone asks for more, if they ask for your answer in light of what you now know are the principles of charity and burden of proof found in academic philosophy, then the best answer is just to invoke some form of epistemic relativism or constructivism, some version of the popular philosophical view that “no one can really know the answer to such questions,” or rather, “if they can, no such knowledge is any better or any worse than any other.” In that case, however, your burden of proof would be specified by the case Boghossian makes, against those views, a case he makes only after construing those views, under the principle of charity.
By way of beginning to discharge your burden of proof, regarding freedom, whatever it happens to be, you will now be taking your logic essentials, your knowledge of modus ponens and modus tollens, and the standard of deductive soundness, and using it to come to terms with the two texts now at issue, Acts 2 and 3 in Lemos.
Here is what now you need to do. First reconstruct in modus ponens what you take to be the main argument from Act 2 that supports the [FC] sense of freedom. Then explain why in terms of that text one might think that the second premise of your argument is true. Then give or reconstruct an argument in modus tollens, which incorporates the very same hypothetical premise as your first argument. Also explain why you think the second premise of this second argument is true. Finally, on the assumption that one of these two arguments is sound, and the other is not, which one do you think is sound, and why do you think as you do?